一般而言，道德判斷具有推動力，這指的是：一旦人們對於行為或是事態做出對錯善惡的判斷，如此的判斷往往會推動人們去從事與判斷相符的行動。誠然，道德判斷未必總是能夠成功地推動人們去做出符合判斷的行動，這在意志軟弱的情形下尤為明顯。然而，所謂的意志軟弱現象，與其說是顯示道德判斷根本不具有推動力，毋寧說是顯示道德判斷仍然具有推動力，只是不夠強大。問題是，如何說明道德判斷所具有的推動力？尤其是當道德的要求違反我們自己的欲望、愛好、利益時？又，道德判斷與推動力之間的關連是必然的或是適然的？而道德判斷能否獨自提供推動力？或是其推動力的提供只能仰賴欲望、情感等意欲狀態的中介方能為之？本課程旨在針對以上這些與道德動力相關的哲學議題進行討論。除此之外，關於道德動力現象在後設倫理學上會有的蘊涵，也屬於本課程處理的議題。
Generally speaking, moral judgments have motivating force, that is to say, once we have made judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to motivate us to act in accordance with them. To be sure, moral judgments do not always succeed in motivating us to act in line with them, especially when our will turns out to be weak. However, the phenomenon of weakness of will, instead of showing moral judgments do not motivate at all, shows their motivating force is not sufficient. Questions arise: how to account for the motivating force that moral judgments are supposed to have, in particular when they go against our desire, preference, and interest? And what is the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation—do moral judgments motivate necessarily or do they motivate only contingently? Can moral judgments motivate on their own or can they motivate only by the intermediation of a desire, emotion or other conative state? This course aims to deal with these issues about moral motivation, and their implication on metaethics.